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FOREWORD 
SHOW ME THE MONEY: MAKING 
MARKETS IN FORBIDDEN EXCHANGE 
KIMBERLY D. KRAWIEC* 
Of all the aphorisms your parents doubtless taught you, at least one is true: 
money can’t buy everything—at least not legally. The law restricts exchange in 
many items and activities, but it does not always do so in the same manner, or 
for the same reasons. We might distinguish three separate categories of items 
and activities in which the law forbids exchange: (1) illegal ones, (2) inalienable 
ones, and (3) those that are both legal and alienable, but in which exchange for 
profit is banned or limited. 
Sometimes exchange is forbidden as a means to restrict access to an item or 
activity considered dangerous or harmful to society. Illegal drugs and some 
types of weapons fall into this category. In these cases, the ban on exchange is 
largely incidental to the overriding goal of public protection from harm. As a 
result of this larger goal, illegal items and activities are simply prohibited 
altogether—their possession, acquisition, and exchange forbidden whether 
acquired by gift, purchase, or any other method. 
Other items, activities, or entitlements are legal but inalienable. Although 
possessing these items or participating in these activities is legal—perhaps, 
admired—the right to possess the item or engage in the activity cannot be 
transferred to another for any purpose, commercial or otherwise. Falling into 
this category are certain licenses and awards, as wells as rights, entitlements, 
and duties incident to one’s status as a member of the community or democratic 
state, such as the right to vote for holders of public office and the right to 
freedom of speech.1 Exchange (for any motive) in these items and activities is, 
therefore, forbidden—not because we consider the items and activities harmful 
to society, but because they are so closely tied to the individual’s rights and 
responsibilities as a member of the community that the state does not allow 
their separation.2 
Finally, commercial exchange is sometimes restricted in items and activities 
that are neither illegal nor inalienable, but that nevertheless cannot be sold for 
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 1. MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 19 (1996) (discussing nontransferability 
and market-inalienability). 
 2. Id. 
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profit, a trait sometimes referred to as market-inalienability.3 The law frowns 
on, or may ban outright, the mixing of items and activities that are viewed as 
inherently noncommercial—even sacrosanct—with the crasser aspects of 
pecuniary markets. This third category of “forbidden exchange” has held a 
particular fascination for researchers across a wide range of disciplines, 
including the contributors to this symposium, perhaps because it seems so 
inconsistent with our default norms that the voluntary exchange of goods and 
services for payment is not only permitted, but encouraged. 
In contrast to the first two categories in which exchange is forbidden, the 
items and activities in this third category of forbidden exchange are not 
inherently suspect, nor is their exchange forbidden under all conditions. Indeed, 
in the appropriate context, these items and activities may be considered salutary 
and necessary. Babies, sex, and human organs, for example, are not in and of 
themselves evils from which the public must be shielded. Instead, it is 
commercial markets in these items from which the state specifically seeks to 
protect its citizens. 
Moreover, such exchange for other purposes—altruism, love, desire, or a 
sense of duty—is not only permitted, but applauded. Indeed, a failure to 
provide these items and activities in the context of particular relationships may 
be considered self-indulgent or reprehensible. My decision to carry and give 
birth to a child for my infertile sister is likely to be commended as a 
compassionate gesture of love and devotion. Your refusal to donate a kidney to 
your dying brother may strike some as inexcusably selfish. A decision to sell 
either to the highest bidder is both illegal and morally condemned. 
Thus, the law—in keeping with individual psychology and communal 
norms—cordons off certain items and activities as being above market 
influences. In fact, theorists across a range of disciplines, including political 
philosophy, cultural anthropology, social psychology, sociology, economics, and 
law have observed that nearly all cultures reserve certain items, activities, and 
entitlements as inalienable for profit.4 
 
 3. Id. at 18 (defining market-inalienability). 
 4. See generally ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS (1993) (discussing 
the ethical limits of markets and the need to compartmentalize exchange in some areas of life from 
market forces, including gift exchanges among personal relations, political goods, reproductive labor, 
and children); JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND (2008) 
(warning of an impending enclosure of the commons of the mind and exploring the transition of various 
items and activities once thought uncommodifiable and outside of the marketplace into privately 
owned property); MARCEL MAUSS, THE GIFT (W.D. Halls trans., 1990) (distinguishing the realm of 
gift exchange from that of market exchange, and arguing that gift exchange creates a form of social 
solidarity because the gift must be reciprocated, creating a continuing cycle of social bond between 
giver and recipient); RADIN, supra note 1 (discussing a range of “contested commodities,” including 
babies, reproductive services, human organs, sperm, eggs, embryos, blood, human pain, and human 
labor); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE (1983) (describing fourteen categories of “blocked 
exchanges”—items, services, and entitlements that cannot be bought or sold); VIVIANA ZELIZER, THE 
PURCHASE OF INTIMACY (2005) (demonstrating that the intermingling of economic transactions with 
intimate relations causes discomfort both for individuals and for U.S. law, despite the fact that such 
intermingling occurs with great frequency); Michael J. Sandel, What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral 
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Philosophers, for example, have long maintained that certain items and 
activities are incommensurable at a very deep level. As Joseph Raz observes, 
[I]t is typical, where options of this kind [that is, constitutive incommensurables] are 
involved, for agents to regard the very thought that they may be comparable in value 
as abhorrent. There are many gradations of lesser or greater reluctance to undertake 
such comparisons. But for almost every person there are comparisons that he will feel 
indignant if asked to make, and which he will, in normal circumstances, emphatically 
refuse to make.5 
Cognitive theorists have contributed to this research by empirically 
documenting the human tendency to mentally compartmentalize, noting the 
extent to which people organize money, objects, relationships, and exchanges 
into distinct mental accounts.6 Alan Page Fiske, for example, develops four 
categories of social relationships, or “relational schema”—communal sharing, 
authority ranking, equality matching, and market pricing—that individuals 
employ to determine how benefits, rights, and responsibilities are allocated 
within a given relationship.7 
Fiske and Philip Tetlock find that people are capable of making value 
comparisons within any one category with ease, but have trouble making such 
comparisons across categories.8 The intensity of the resistance to contemplating 
a cross-category value comparison depends on both the distance and the 
direction between the two schemas involved in the calculation.9 Most mentally 
troubling are value comparisons that require the subject to apply market-
pricing norms to communal-sharing relationships—in other words, invasions of 
the market into gift, intimate, or similarly sacred territory. Such questions elicit 
more than the mere confusion or inability to compare values associated with 
 
Limits of Markets, The Tanner Lectures on Human Values Delivered at Brasenose College, University 
of Oxford (May 11–12, 1998) (criticizing the encroachment of markets and market-oriented thinking 
into areas of life traditionally immune from such influences). 
 5. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 346 (1986); see also ANDERSON, supra note 4, at 
44–64 (discussing incommensurability of this sort); infra notes 8–12 and accompanying text (discussing 
incommensurability in more detail, and distinguishing cognitive incommensurability from constitutive 
incommensurability). 
 6. See generally Alan Page Fiske & Philip E. Tetlock, Taboo Trade-Offs: Reactions to 
Transactions that Transgress the Spheres of Justice, 18 POL. PSYCHOL. 255 (1997) (discussing the mental 
and social categorization of objects, activities, relationships, and transactions); Richard H. Thaler, 
Mental Accounting Matters, 12 J. BEHAV. DEC. MAKING 183 (1999) (summarizing the research on the 
mental compartmentalization of funds into separate accounts for different purposes). 
 7. Fiske & Tetlock, supra note 6, at 258. The communal-sharing schema dictates that benefits and 
responsibilities are shared among the group. Familial relationships are typically characterized by 
communal-sharing norms, as are certain specific items or benefits that have been designated as 
belonging to a communal-sharing regime, such as national defense or the right to vote. Authority 
ranking ordinally ranks individual access to benefits according to some hierarchy, such as status or 
seniority, as would be typical in the military, for example. Equality matching allocates rights and 
responsibilities according to “tit for tat” rules. Many friendships and casual acquaintances are 
organized in this manner. Finally, the market-pricing schema dictates that goods and services are 
allocated according to the rules of commerce. Id.; see also ALAN PAGE FISKE, STRUCTURES OF SOCIAL 
LIFE: THE FOUR ELEMENTARY FORMS OF HUMAN RELATIONS (1991). 
 8. Fiske & Tetlock, supra note 6, at 258. 
 9. Id. at 278. 
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cognitive incommensurability, instead engendering anger, moral outrage, and a 
desire for norm enforcement.10 In other words, some trades are constitutively 
incommensurable—not just confusing, but so immoral that merely to consider 
them compromises the individual’s self-image as a member of the relevant 
social community.11 Fiske and Tetlock explain that “attach[ing] a monetary 
value to one’s friendships or one’s children or one’s loyalty to one’s country . . . 
demonstrates that one is not a true friend, or parent, or citizen.”12 
It would be incorrect to assume, however, that the individual mental 
accounting, social norms, and laws regarding the proper scope of commercial 
activity are universal, preordained, or inflexible. In fact, researchers across 
disciplines have demonstrated both the malleability and context-dependency of 
individual mental accounting, and the socially constructed nature of relational 
boundaries, which vary across time and cultures. 
For example, despite the cognitive resistance to value comparisons across 
relational schema and the frequent insistence that some values, relationships, or 
activities are sacred or priceless, individuals frequently make such trade-offs—
particularly trade-offs that cause an encroachment of the market-pricing 
schema into the other relational schema.13 Although this is especially true for 
those charged with decisionmaking authority over social policy, scarce 
resources force each of us to at least implicitly attach dollar values to 
theoretically nonfungible items and activities, and to sacrifice supposedly 
priceless values to the cold realities of finite economic resources, with some 
frequency. For example, although most parents would find the notion of trading 
any increment in their child’s safety or welfare for a monetary price abhorrent, 
in reality parents regularly make such trade-offs—a failure to do so would entail 
a dedication of the parent’s entire net worth to her child, thus impoverishing 
herself.14 People adopt a variety of coping strategies to relieve the cognitive 
discomfort caused by such choices and comparisons, including the ready 
acceptance of smoke screens designed to obfuscate the fact that a trade-off 
across boundaries has occurred, redefining the transaction as one that involves 
a routine trade-off (for example, one market-pricing relation for another), or a 
tragic trade-off (the sacrifice of one sacred value for another, such as putting 
one child’s needs before those of another child).15 
 
 10. When values are cognitively incommensurable, people are unable or unwilling to evaluate 
certain comparisons because they have no basis by which to determine how much of X to give up in 
exchange for Y. Id. at 256; RAZ, supra note 5, at 321–57 (defining and discussing incommensurability in 
great detail). 
 11. RAZ, supra note 5, at 345–53 (introducing the concept of constitutive incommensurables). 
 12. Fiske & Tetlock, supra note 6, at 256. 
 13. Philip E. Tetlock, Thinking the Unthinkable: Sacred Values and Taboo Cognitions, 7 TRENDS 
COGNITIVE SCI. 320, 320 (2003). 
 14. Id. at 321. 
 15. Id. 
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Similarly, policymakers are regularly faced with choices that cross relational 
boundaries. When determining the legal status of insurance contracts,16 the 
prospect of tort damages for various injuries or loss of life,17 or conducting cost–
benefit analysis to choose among policies regarding public health, safety, and 
environmental quality,18 policymakers are at least implicitly valuing in economic 
terms items and ideals that many contend are irreducible to monetary values. In 
other words, they are transgressing important social norms regarding the way in 
which we account for certain items, ideas, and values. For their own political 
survival, successful policymakers adopt a variety of tactics to deflect blame for 
such transgressions, including decision-avoidance tactics, such as buck-passing 
and procrastination, and obfuscation tactics designed to mask the trade-offs.19 
In a similar vein, Viviana Zelizer has noted that the numerous vigorous 
debates on the propriety of markets in eggs, blood, human organs, sexual 
relations, and other arenas traditionally thought too sacred to be governed by 
market-pricing norms rarely appreciate the extent to which intimate and 
economic activity already commingle in daily life.20 These invasions of the 
profane (market pricing) into the sacred are not only common, but have 
significant macroeconomic consequences, including large wealth transfers from 
rich to poor nations and from one generation to the next.21 
Moreover, when a relationship or transaction in one relational schema 
closely resembles one in another, individuals go to great lengths to distinguish 
them, including through adherence to transaction-exchange rules appropriate to 
that relational schema.22 Although one’s relations with a wife, a date, a 
girlfriend, a mistress, and a prostitute may have similarities, the participants can 
and do define and distinguish the boundaries of the relationship, in part, 
through the type of exchange principles that operate in each. What is the 
appropriate thank you for an enjoyable evening? Flowers, jewelry, cash, or 
doing the dishes? The choice of exchange terms signals much about the nature 
of the relationship itself. 
 
 16. See generally VIVIANA A. ROTMAN ZELIZER, MORALS & MARKETS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
LIFE INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES (1983) (tracing early opposition to life insurance in the 
United States to cultural beliefs that prohibited the valuation of human life in monetary terms, and 
attributing the market’s phenomenal success after 1840 to changes in these attitudes); Roy Kreitner, 
Speculations of Contract, or How Contract Law Stopped Worrying and Learned to Love Risk, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 1096 (2000) (discussing early legal opposition to life insurance and attributing its 
eventual acceptance to various legal doctrines, including the doctrine of insurable interest, that 
distinguished insurance from gambling on death). 
 17. RADIN, supra note 1, at 184–205 (categorizing compensation for harms suffered as a contested 
commodity). 
 18. ANDERSON, supra note 4, at 190–216 (arguing that the reduction of these values to monetary 
terms for purposes of choosing among competing policies expresses an attitude toward those values 
that most people find deeply disturbing). 
 19. Fiske & Tetlock, supra note 6, at 257. 
 20. ZELIZER, supra note 4, at 27. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 34. 
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In addition, social norms regarding the contours of these relational 
boundaries and the proper means of exchange within them are permeable and 
changing. Although relational schema and rules of proper exchange within and 
across them are a feature of all cultures and civilizations, implementation rules 
specify when and how each schema applies.23 Cultural norms provide most of 
these implementation rules, meaning that the rules vary over time and across 
societies, and may be ambiguous or contentious at the margins.24 Moreover, 
technological innovation, social or political change, or other developments may 
create previously unknown circumstances for which no existing implementation 
rule exists, causing social strain.25 
To illustrate, when people encounter others from another culture that 
applies different implementation rules, these new contacts may seem strange or 
savage. When the French colonized the Moose people of western Africa, for 
example, they were befuddled by the Moose application of communal-sharing 
norms to agricultural land, which the Moose treated as a commons. The French 
forced market-pricing norms on the colony through a variety of mechanisms, 
including per capita flat taxes and mandated cash crops. Similarly, the Moose 
were so disturbed by the western application of market-pricing mechanisms to 
areas such as work and the distribution of food that a Moose myth developed 
that French parents kept careful accountings throughout their children’s lives 
and presented them with an itemized bill for the expenses associated with their 
upbringing at maturity.26 
Finally, even within a given society, social norms and legal rules regarding 
relational boundaries and proper valuation and exchange terms within them 
evolve over time. Sometimes, for example, a trade or market once considered 
commonplace and legitimate becomes forbidden. Both slavery and military 
conscription, for example, would fall today into our second category of 
forbidden exchange—rights, obligations, or items that are inalienable and 
cannot be transferred to another for profit or any other motive. Yet slavery and 
indentured servitude were once legal—and economically important—markets, 
including in the United States, until forbidden by the Thirteenth Amendment.27 
Similarly, it was historically commonplace, both in the United States and 
elsewhere, for the wealthy to buy their way out of military service through 
either commutation (a direct payment to the government) or through 
substitution (paying another to serve in one’s stead).28 Originally arising out of 
 
 23. Fiske & Tetlcok, supra note 6, at 259. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 274. 
 27. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as 
punishment for a crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United 
States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”). 
 28. Margaret Levi, Conscription: The Price of Citizenship, in ANALYTIC NARRATIVES 109, 109 
(Robert H. Bates et. al eds., 1998); The Draft; The Three Hundred Dollar Exemption, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
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obligations feudal subjects owed to their lord, the practice was defended in the 
nineteenth century by a variety of rationales, including the greater burden 
military service imposed on the privileged as compared to those more 
accustomed to hardship, and on the efficiency advantages of allowing those who 
could better serve their country through other productive means to do so, while 
still contributing to the war effort through payments to the government war 
chest or through the provision of a suitable substitute for service.29 These 
defenses eventually lost favor, however, and by the end of the nineteenth 
century both commutation and substitution had disappeared throughout the 
United States and Europe.30 In the United States, commutation disappeared 
after the second Civil War draft, and substitution (although eliminated by the 
Confederacy in December of 1863 and replaced with occupational exemptions) 
endured until sometime near the end of the century.31 However, the practice 
continued to fall out of favor to the point that, by World War I, substitution was 
not merely disfavored, but unthinkable.32 
By contrast, some markets once forbidden, or at least contested, eventually 
become commonplace or less contested. For example, lending money for profit 
was frequently considered illegal or sinful during ancient and medieval times.33 
With the possible exception of Islamic law, this traditional hostility to for-profit 
money lending has largely vanished, and interest on loans is now charged as a 
matter of course, although some restrictions on the practice are still evident 
through usury laws.34 
Meanwhile, severe organ shortages and advances in medical science have 
deeply strained the traditionally forbidden status of markets in human organs.35 
Amid increasing calls from researchers, medical professionals, and others to 
 
7, 1863, at 2 (discussing differences between commutation and substitution under the Conscription Act 
of 1863). 
 29. Levi, supra note 28, at 109–10. 
 30. Id. at 110. 
 31. Id. at 131–37 (describing this process, and the reasons for the continued existence of 
substitution, despite the fact that it was less equitable than commutation and available only to the very 
rich); James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era, in JUSTICE 131, 132–33 
(Michael J. Sandel ed., 2007) (discussing commutation as a means of capping the price of substitution, 
thus making it more affordable to the middle classes, and also describing the eventual abandonment of 
both practices). 
 32. Levi, supra note 28, at 137. 
 33. SIDNEY HOMER & RICHARD SYLLA, A HISTORY OF INTEREST RATES 10 (1996). 
 34. Alvin E. Roth, Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 37, 39–40 (2007) 
(discussing the traditional repugnance toward money lending). 
 35. See, e.g., KIERAN HEALY, LAST BEST GIFTS: ALTRUISM AND THE MARKET FOR HUMAN 
BLOOD AND ORGANS (2006) (analyzing the role of procurement organizations in rates of organ and 
blood donation and urging the necessity of sensitivity to this role if incentive programs to reduce 
shortages are to be successful); Gary S. Becker and Julio Jorge Elias, Introducing Incentives in the 
Market for Live and Cadaveric Organ Donations, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 3 (2007) (arguing that financial 
incentives could address problems of organ scarcity without significantly increasing the cost of organ 
transplant surgery); Roth, supra note 34, at 39–40 (discussing the role of repugnance as a constraint on 
the market’s ability to reduce the kidney shortage and urging the study of in-kind exchange to reduce 
the current shortage). 
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reconsider the issue, the American Medical Association voted in June of 2008 
to lobby Congress to amend the National Organ Transplant Act to permit study 
of the impact of financial incentives on rates of cadaveric organ donation.36 
Some medical professionals, including some transplant surgeons, have argued 
that the proposal does not go far enough and urge the study of financial 
incentives for live organ donation as well.37 Similar tensions are evident in the 
markets for reproductive services and adoptions, causing some researchers to 
argue—formal bans against baby selling notwithstanding—that a robust and 
growing international baby market is evident.38 
The point of the foregoing discussion is that people take their 
implementation rules regarding relational boundaries and the acceptable means 
of exchange within them as a given, only rarely reflecting on the reasons for 
them, and without realizing their socially constructed nature. In the United 
States (and in many other societies) today, one of the strongest implementation 
rules is a norm against the application of market-pricing rules to items or 
relationships that we regard as appropriately governed by the communal-
sharing schema.39 We take as fixed the notion that, with respect to certain basic 
items, needs, and relationships—our body parts, our sexuality, and our children, 
for example—distribution must not be dictated by market-pricing norms.40 It 
seems intrinsically wrong to us to offer our bodies, our children, or our organs 
for sale—to even seriously propose such trades marks the proposer as a 
destabilizer of the social order.41 
Yet the contributors to this symposium contemplate exactly these kinds of 
trades, considering at length the consequences of making—and of restricting—
markets in various types of traditionally forbidden or contested exchange, 
including human blood, organs, eggs, sperm, reproductive services, and labor. 
What are the problems with, objections to, defenses of, impediments for, 
developments in, and challenges facing markets in these traditionally forbidden 
or contested areas of commercial exchange? What is the effect of prohibiting or 
impeding commercially motivated transactions in these areas? As we move 
toward greater market-based exchange in some of these items and activities, 
 
 36. JoNel Aleccia, Docs Push for Tests of Cash Rewards for Organs, MSNBC.com, June 25, 2008, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25356966/. 
 37. Id. (quoting Benjamin Hippen, a kidney transplant specialist and member of the United 
Network for Organ Sharing Ethics Committee); Laura Meckler, Kidney Shortage Inspires a Radical 
Idea: Organ Sales, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 2007, at A1 (discussing the advocacy of Arthur Matas, former 
president of the American Society of Transplant Surgeons, on behalf of financial incentives for organ 
donation). 
 38. See, e.g., DEBORA L. SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS: HOW SCIENCE AND POLITICS DRIVE THE 
COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION (2006) (documenting the global baby business); Kimberly D. Krawiec, 
Altruism and Intermediation in the Market for Babies, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 203 (documenting the 
legal baby trade and arguing that “baby-selling bans” have more in common with the rent seeking 
observed in other commercial markets than with grand normative statements about sacred values). 
 39. Fiske & Tetlock, supra note 6 at 278. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
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what outcomes might we expect? What must those markets look like, who will 
intermediate them, and how must the legal regime governing the market 
participants be structured in order to guard against our traditional fears of 
market-based approaches to exchange in these areas? These are the questions 
to which our contributors seek, if not answers, at least insight. 
For example, in Trafficking in Human Blood: Titmuss (1970) and Products 
Liability, Clark C. Havighurst notes that in the many debates about the proper 
roles of altruism versus commercialism in the collection and distribution of 
human blood prompted by the 1970 publication (and 1997 republication) of 
Richard Titmuss’s The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy, 
discussion of the potential impact of a strict product-liability rule, rather than a 
fault-based liability rule, has been almost completely absent.42 Havighurst 
documents substantial industry collusion among blood fractionators in the face 
of the emerging HIV/AIDs epidemic in the early 1980s, which he contends 
limited the swiftness and independence with which blood fractionators might 
otherwise have responded to the crisis. Havighurst concludes that theories, such 
as those popularized by Titmuss, that human blood collection should be left to 
the dictates of personal altruism and professional standards, rather than to 
market forces, liability rules, and consumer choice, arguably left the public 
more vulnerable to blood contamination in the face of the HIV crisis than 
would have been the case if a more commercial approach to the blood industry 
had been openly accepted. 
Moving next to organ markets, Julia D. Mahoney makes the cautious case 
for the transition to some system of compensated organ procurement. In 
Altruism, Markets, and Organ Procurement, she notes that her advocacy for a 
measured approach to financial incentives is not motivated by the strength of 
objections to organ markets.43 To the contrary, Mahoney dissects with skill and 
precision traditional objections to organ markets—including objections based 
on improper commodification, the potential crowding out of donation, safety 
concerns, increased transplant costs, and the exploitation of the vulnerable—
demonstrating that these criticisms “range from the highly contestable to the 
demonstrably wrong.”44 Instead, Mahoney’s measured approach stems from the 
potential challenge of moving from a procurement system based on altruistic 
donation to one based on financial incentives, particularly when that transition 
may meet with resistance from the public, procurement organizations, 
healthcare professionals, and even potential donors themselves. 
Closely related to both the organ markets analyzed by Mahoney and the 
parenthood markets discussed by other symposium contributors, Rene 
Almeling, in Gender and the Value of Bodily Goods: Commodification in Egg 
 
 42. Clark C. Havighurst, Trafficking in Human Blood: Titmuss (1970) and Products Liability, 72 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (Summer 2009). 
 43. Julia D. Mahoney, Altruism, Markets, and Organ Procurement, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
17 (Summer 2009). 
 44. Id. at 19. 
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and Sperm Donation,45 and I, in Sunny Samaritans and Egomaniacs: Price-fixing 
in the Gamete Market,46 consider the markets for human eggs and sperm. 
Almeling and I rely on similar data, including prior field research by Almeling, 
to reach both similar, and quite different, conclusions. We both argue that, for 
biological and social reasons, the structure of the gamete market is highly 
gendered. The result is a reliance on stereotypical images of men as 
dispassionate laborers interested only in financial reward and of women as 
altruistic “helpers,” attracted primarily by the opportunity to aid the infertile, 
despite the large fees paid to egg donors in exchange for their services. 
Almeling and I agree that these gendered market and institutional 
approaches are more than mere marketing rhetoric—instead, they affect the 
experiences and expectations of donors and the structure of the gamete market 
and its participants in profound ways. However, we disagree about the 
consequences of this state of affairs. Almeling contends that eggs and egg 
donors are more highly valued than sperm and sperm donors, but concedes that 
women are required to expend emotional effort not required of men, by 
“guiltily hiding any interest they might have in the promise of thousands of 
dollars.”47 She concludes that “it is not just reproductive material, but visions of 
middle-class American femininity and masculinity, and more to the point, of 
motherhood and fatherhood, that are marketed and purchased.”48 
In contrast, I conclude that, although the existing evidence suggests that egg 
donors receive higher per-transaction fees than sperm donors, the hourly rate of 
egg donor compensation is lower than the hourly sperm donor wage, despite the 
higher risk, invasiveness, and physical discomfort associated with egg donation. 
Moreover, this state of affairs is maintained through illegal collusion by the 
fertility industry. Whereas, as in most other industries, the economic forces of 
supply and demand are allowed to set sperm prices, egg prices are set through 
the same type of professional standards and pricing “guidelines” that have been 
declared per se illegal in other industries. Although biological and economic 
factors undoubtedly play some role in this difference, I argue that gendered 
norms regarding women’s altruistic nature—particularly in sacred areas, such as 
reproduction—contribute to the ability to collude on price. 
Hugh V. McLachlan, J. Kim Swales, and Elizabeth S. Scott turn their 
attention to the issue of surrogacy markets. In Commercial Surrogate 
Motherhood and the Alleged Commodification of Children: A Defense of 
Legally Enforceable Contracts, McLachlan and Swales defend the legal 
enforceability of surrogacy contracts, as well as their prior work on commercial 
surrogacy, against criticisms by others, including Elizabeth S. Anderson, Eric 
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Blyth, and Claire Potter.49 McLachlan and Swales tackle conventional objections 
to commercial surrogacy, including arguments based on the best interests of the 
child and improper commodification, concluding that these objections to 
commercial surrogate motherhood are “based on an irrational prejudice against 
monetary transactions and a groundless general preference for services that are 
offered without a financial fee.”50 Instead, McLachlan and Swales contend, 
rational prospective parents may consider that there are advantages and 
disadvantages to both altruistic and commercial surrogacy, and intended 
parents should be allowed to freely choose which system best suits their 
preferences. 
Meanwhile, in Surrogacy and the Politics of Commodification, Scott 
examines the history of commercial surrogacy, from the moral panic seeking to 
stamp out commercial surrogacy that ensued after the Baby M decision, to the 
more sanguine view evidenced today by many courts and legislatures, which 
seek primarily to ensure certainty of parentage and to address other policy 
concerns arising from commercial surrogacy.51 Scott attributes the changed legal 
environment to the changed social environment, which eventually repackaged 
commercial surrogacy from a harmful, destabilizing force that coerced women 
and commodified children, into an altruistic gift freely offered to sympathetic, 
deserving, infertile couples unable to reproduce without the surrogate’s help. 
Although Scott traces this change in social norms to a variety of factors, 
including the advent of gestational surrogacy and the failure of the predicted 
harms attributed to commercial surrogacy markets to materialize, of particular 
interest is her analysis of the evolving views of feminists and liberals to the 
commercial surrogacy question and the resulting demise of the unstable 
coalition formed among feminists, liberals, and social conservatives in the wake 
of Baby M. 
Scott’s analysis is particularly salient today: will the more pragmatic 
contemporary approach to commercial surrogacy continue, or are we 
potentially poised for a second wave of moral panic? As Scott notes, the recent 
growth in the “outsourcing” of surrogacy to developing nations, particularly 
India, seems to have struck a nerve with an American public largely content to 
support or ignore commercial surrogacy arrangements within the United 
States.52 And, even as this symposium goes to press, debate surges over Alex 
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Kuczynski’s recent first-hand account of her own commercial surrogacy 
arrangement in The New York Times Magazine.53 
In The Debt Financing of Parenthood, Melissa B. Jacoby considers a vitally 
important, yet frequently overlooked, aspect of making markets in traditionally 
forbidden exchange: how such exchange will be financed and the potential 
policy implications of those financing choices.54 Jacoby notes that, although 
discussions of consumer credit as a means to smooth mismatches between 
income and consumption are standard fare in the context of other commercial 
markets, discussion of the roles of either debt or credit in the parenthood 
market rarely rises above the level of anecdotes raised in passing, with most 
observers assuming that cash or insurance are the only viable options for 
financing infertility. 
Jacoby observes that major lenders have begun to enter the parenthood 
market, offering separately tailored credit products to those seeking either 
infertility treatments or adoption, often at high interest rates. Although 
nonprofits offer a cheaper alternative in the adoption market, their savings 
often come with their own price tag: credit may be conditioned on the 
characteristics of the adopted child (disabled, nonwhite, or older) or of the 
intended parents (such as marital status, sexual orientation, religious affiliation, 
or the observance of traditional gender roles). Jacoby predicts that the entrance 
of repeat-player lenders offering specialized fertility credit products is likely 
both to increase the size of the parenthood market and to alter the market’s 
structure and political economy. 
In Excluding Unfit Workers: Social Control Versus Social Justice in the Age 
of Economic Reform, David E. Bernstein and Thomas C. Leonard consider the 
original contested commodity—human labor.55 Bernstein and Leonard argue 
that immigration, working poverty, and the relationship of women to the 
marketplace are not simply modern political and economic issues, but were vital 
and contentious issues a century ago, laying the groundwork for American 
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labor reforms, including minimum-wage laws, that had previously been 
considered unthinkable government limitations on free exchange in the labor 
market. Bernstein and Leonard analyze the history and impact of three 
legislative movements—the Davis–Bacon Act, the New Deal minimum-wage 
legislation, and single-sex minimum-wage laws—concluding that both the intent 
and the ultimate impact of the laws were to eliminate from the marketplace 
African Americans, immigrants, women, and other “substandard” workers 
unable to command a “living wage.” 
The Bernstein and Leonard article readily evokes the problem of the 
“double bind” introduced by Margaret Jane Radin, although it should be noted 
that Radin ultimately supports minimum-wage laws and other forms of work 
regulation.56 However, Radin recognized that restricting or forbidding certain 
forms of exchange for fear that they inappropriately commodify or coerce a 
subset of the population—such as women in the case of prostitution, or the poor 
in the case of organ selling—may have the effect of eliminating the only viable 
economic opportunity for an already-disadvantaged class of persons. Bernstein 
and Leonard demonstrate that many progressive and New Deal reformers 
believed that the lowest-wage workers—African Americans, immigrants, 
women, and other undesirables—drove down wages for everyone, since they 
were willing to work for wages and under conditions that white union men were 
not. They conclude that much labor-reform legislation was not designed to 
bring the wages of these groups up to those of white men, but to exclude them 
from the marketplace altogether by making it illegal to work for less than a 
“living wage,” defined by reference to what a white, male worker could 
command in the marketplace. 
In conclusion, perhaps money can’t buy everything, but as the contributors 
to this volume demonstrate, it buys more than is commonly assumed. From 
blood and organs to eggs, sperm, and parenthood, money is closely intertwined 
with numerous items, activities, and relationships that many contend should be 
impervious to, or even sacredly immune from, market forces. In other words, 
the market-pricing schema invades our other relational schema, including the 
communal-sharing schema, with a great deal of frequency. As resource scarcity 
and scientific, medical, and technological advancement continue to expand, this 
trend is likely to continue. 
Moreover, attempts to limit these incursions of market forces into other 
arenas may not operate uniformly. As argued by some of our contributors, 
attempts to forbid or restrict market exchange may disproportionately harm 
those already disadvantaged in the marketplace. Rather than reject the 
possibility of commercial exchange in traditionally forbidden or contested 
areas, the contributors to this symposium face the challenge head on, seriously 
considering the costs, consequences, benefits, and dangers of the complicated 
overlap between communal sharing and market pricing, gift and commerce, 
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altruism and profit-seeking, sacred and profane. This is no easy task. As 
demonstrated by our contributors, popular notions regarding the existence of 
sacred spheres of life immune from market forces are, at a minimum, overstated 
and, in some cases, wholly false. Such beliefs, nonetheless, are genuine formal 
and informal constraints on the development of markets in forbidden exchange. 
Negotiating the boundaries and limits of legal and societal definitions of 
forbidden exchange in the face of resource constraints, scientific innovation, 
and changing social mores will be the future challenge for scholars in these 
fields. 
 
